The Lion King and Malchus Shamayim

Ever since I saw Disney's The Lion King earlier this year, I've wanted to write a series of posts on it. Sean and I spent a few weeks defining the philosophy of each of the main characters: Mufasa, Scar, Timon and Pumbaa, the hyenas, and Simba. But alas, I never got around to writing any of it up.

However, the liberating experience of Pesach has caused me to reflect on The Lion King once again. In realized that Mufasa represents the philosophy of the Torah, and Scar represents the philosophy of Pharaoh.

Mufasa's Philosophy

Mufasa's entire philosophy can be seen in his words to Simba, his son:

Mufasa: Everything you see exists together in a delicate balance. As king, you need to understand that balance and respect all the creatures, from the crawling ant to the leaping antelope.
Young Simba: But dad, don't we eat the antelope?
Mufasa: Yes, Simba, but let me explain. When we die, our bodies become the grass, and the antelope eat the grass. And so we are all connected in the great Circle of Life.

What Mufasa calls "The Circle of Life," the Torah refers to as Malchus Shamayim: the harmonious system of natural law which organizes all of the matter in the universe into the hierarchy of forms we know. The term "Circle" refers to the cyclical, ongoing process of organization and reorganization of matter into its various forms. The Rambam discusses this in the Mishneh Torah (Laws of the Foundations of Torah 4:3-5):

Every entity which is a combination of the elements will ultimately decompose into them. Some will decompose after a few days, and others will decompose after many years. It is impossible for anything which is a combination of them not to decompose into them. It is impossible even for gold and ruby not to decompose and return to their fundamental elements . . .

Every entity that decomposes will not return to the fundamental elements immediately. Rather, it will decompose and change into another entity. That entity will, in turn, change into another entity, until ultimately, it will return to the elements. Thus, all entities are constantly returning [to their elemental state] in a cycle.

These elements are in a constant state of flux at, with a certain portion - but never the entire matter - of one changing into another every day and every hour . . . From the combination of these elements are the forms of men, living beasts, plants, stones, and metals. God gives each body the form appropriate to it through the tenth malach, which is the tzurah called ishim.

Mufasa's philosophy can be summed up as follows: Every creature must understand and appreciate its own tzurah and the tzurah of all other creatures, and strive to live in accordance with Malchus Shamayim.


The Circle of Life

This philosophy is expressed in the song, "The Circle of Life":

From the day we arrive on the planet

And blinking, step into the sun

There's more to see than can ever be seen

More to do than can ever be done

There's far too much to take in here

More to find than can ever be found

But the sun rolling high

Through the sapphire sky

Keeps great and small on the endless round

It's the Circle of Life

And it moves us all

Through despair and hope

Through faith and love

Till we find our place

On the path unwinding

In the Circle

The Circle of Life

The Circle of Life (the continual expression of tzurah in the material world) is that which "moves us all" (is the cause of all change and organization in the universe). In the case of the plants, animals, and other bodies which are not endowed with intellect, this movement occurs naturally. But we human beings "must find our place" in the Circle of Life (understand our own form and the totality of Malchus Shamayim to the greatest extent possible, and live in accordance with this knowledge). This is a lifelong process, which begins "from the day we arrive on this planet, and blinking step into the sun" (when our minds are first illuminated by the light of knowledge). The wisdom expressed in the universe is infinite and our existence is limited: "there is more to see than can ever be seen, more to do than can ever be done." Since life is a journey from ignorance to knowledge, we perceive it as "a path unwinding," filled with both "despair and hope," which we must strive to understand in light of the Circle of Life.

Scar's Philosophy

Scar, Mufasa's evil brother, expresses his philosophy in the lyrics of his song, "Be Prepared!":

I never thought hyenas essential. They're crude and unspeakably plain. But maybe they've a glimmer of potential. If allied to my vision and brain.

The future is littered with prizes. And though I'm the main addressee. The point that I must emphasize is. You won't get a sniff without me!

So prepare for the coup of the century. Be prepared for the murkiest scam. Meticulous planning. Tenacity spanning. Decades of denial is simply why I'll be king undisputed.

Respected, saluted. And seen for the wonder I am. Yes, my teeth and ambitions are bared. Be prepared!

Scar's philosophy can be summed up as follows: All creatures are nothing but the instruments to securing supremacy and dominion, which can only be achieved through careful planning, ruthless manipulation, deception, and ambition.

Scar has no respect for any other creature because he views himself as superior to them. Their existence only has value "if allied to my vision and brain." He does not view the environment as the expression of Idea in the material world, which is Good in its own right. Instead, he sees the world as "littered with prizes" and assumes that "I am the main addressee." He wishes to see himself as the source of existence for all other creatures ("You won't get a sniff without me!"), and his ambition is to make them recognize that he is "the king, undisputed." He is driven to be "respected, saluted, recognized for the wonder I am."

Pharaoh had the same philosophy. "Thus said the Lord, Hashem/Elokim: I am against you, Pharaoh, king of Egypt, the great serpent that crouches within its rivers, who has said, 'The river is mine, and I made myself'" (Yechezkiel 29:3). In Pharaoh's mind, the Nile - the source of all life in Egypt - exists for him and because of him. Pharaoh's twisted mind proclaims, "I am the one who provides the good for all of Egypt!" Pharaoh does not recognize the Nile as a natural system created by God which benefits all creatures, of which he is but one example. He sees the Nile as power to be harnessed to sustain a kingdom whose ultimate purpose is to glorify his own supreme existence.

Hashem, through the agency of Moshe Rabbeinu, showed Pharaoh that his philosophy was incorrect by causing the ecosystem - which he believed was under his dominion - to rebel against him and to destroy him. The purpose of the plagues (which I regret not discussing on this blog before Pesach) was to show Pharaoh, the Egyptians, the Jews, and the rest of the world, "that the earth belongs to Hashem" - that He is the One Who organizes the matter in the universe, including man; "that there is none like Me in all the Earth" - that Pharaoh is not a supreme being, as he would imagine, but that he is a creature who is dependent on the beneficence of the Creator like everything else.

Two Philosophies of Kingship

The opposite philosophies of Mufasa and Scar can be seen in the manner of their kingship.

Scar's goal is to dominate the animal kingdom, and to reign as the supreme beast upon which all other animals are subordinate. Unlike Mufasa, Scar has disregards the Circle of Life. Instead, Scar seeks to impose his own self-centered design onto the natural order. This becomes apparent to the entire Pride Rock population soon after after Scar kills Mufasa and assumes control. He disrupts the food chain by enslaving the lions and turning them into hunters for the new, artificial dominant class: himself and the hyenas. Not only that, but Scar pushes the lions to hunt more than they naturally need. This leads to an over hunting of the pridelands, and the herds begin to move on, resulting in a famine. Eventually, the entire ecosystem of the Pridelands begins to collapse, even to the point where the climate changes, and the lush savanna becomes an shadowy wasteland.

Mufasa views his role as king in a completely different way. To him, "King" is nothing but a position in the natural order, and is no reason to feel inherently superior to any other animal. He tells Simba: "A king's time as ruler rises and falls like the sun. One day, Simba, the sun will set on my time here, and will rise with you as the new king." His influence on the ecosystem is necessary, but his time is limited. The position of king is eternal, but the particular kings come into being for a limited time and then perish, like all other material bodies.

What ultimately happens to Scar? He is eaten by the hyenas whom he had enslaved and forced to live like lions. The tzurah of the hyena, which Scar attempted to eradicate by forcing them to live like lions, exerted itself and overpowered Scar's efforts. Like Pharaoh, the consequences of denying Malchus Shamayim finally caught up to him, and overthrew the artificial Malchus Scar. As Shlomo ha'Melech states, "Like a roaring lion and a growling bear, so is a wicked ruler over a destitute people." Because he chose to rule with evil, Scar was destroyed by his own actions.

Baruch ha'Makom #3

• "Blessed is the Makom Who gave Torah to Israel, His nation. The Torah spoke to four sons: chacham, rasha, tam, and eino yodea lishol."
• Questions: (1) What is the purpose of this introduction? (2) Why is the introduction written in the form of a berachah (blessing)? (3) What is the meaning of “Ha’Makom” ("The Place") as a name of God? (4) Why is Ha’Makom used here? (5) What is the subject of the berachah?
• Step #1: Ha'Makom does not mean "the Omnipresent One." Rather, it means: "The Source of All Existence," which alludes to the idea that His Existence is Necessary and Independent, in contrast to the existence of the universe, which is contingent.
• Step #2: The statement "Baruch Ha'Makom" means "the Source of all existence is the source of good." This statement reorients us to the true idea of good: conformity of matter to tzurah - not the conformity of matter to our own fantasy-worlds of good and bad, which serve only to promote our own false sense of god-like supremacy.

Arbah Banim: A Guide to Mitzvah Education

Before we "translate" the rest of the berachah, we should note that the Arbah Banim section of the Hagadah is not about the mitzvah of sipur yetzias mitzrayim per se. Although it appears to be a guide for fathers about how to fulfill the mitzvah of sipur yetzias mitzrayim with different types of children, it is really about mitzvah education in general. Mitzvas sipur yetzias mitzrayim is just the example that the author of the Hagadah used.

This can be seen in the second statement in the introduction: "The Torah spoke to four sons: chacham, rasha, tam, and eino yodea lishol." It doesn't say, "Mitzvas sipur yetzias mitzrayim must be tailored to four sons." Moreover, the question asked by the ben chacham is about the mitzvos in general, and has nothing to do with Pesach in particular.

Baruch Ha'Makom Who Gave the Torah: Mitzvos as Means of Existence

When translated, this sentence reads: "The Source of all existence, Who is the source of good, gave the Torah." This subject of this statement is Torah. Just as we noted that the statement "Baruch Ha'Makom" reorienting us to the true idea of good, the statement "Baruch Ha'Makom Who gave the Torah" reorients us to the good of mitzvos. How do we ordinarily view mitzvos and how does the person who recites this berachah view mitzvos?

Most of us perform mitzvos without thinking about them at all, in a manner the nevi'im (prophets) refer to as "mitzvas anashim melumada" (loosely translated as "habitual mitzvah performance"). Others are aware of taamei ha'mitzvos - the idea that the mitzvos have reasons, and that they were given to us for our benefit. They know to ask the question: "How is this mitzvah supposed to benefit me?"

But the berachah of "Baruch Ha'Makom Who gave the Torah" goes one step further. To say "The Source of all existence, Who is the source of good, gave the Torah" is to say that mitzvos are our means of attaining existence. This view of mitzvos demands that we ask more fundamental question about the mitzvos we do. Before we can ask, "What is the benefit of this mitzvah?" we must ask, "What am I? What is a human being?" Goodness is completeness of existence. In order to understanding the good of mitzvos, we must understand our own existence. Only then can we ask the question: "How does this mitzvah help me to attain human existence?"

This berachah teaches us a fundamentally different way of understanding mitzvos. Because we are human beings, and are driven by an egocentric animal-psyche which seeks to impose its fantasy-notions of good and bad upon the external world, we are blinded to the true good in all aspects of our lives. The system of 613 mitzvos extends to all aspects of our lives in order to pull us out of our fantasy-notions of good and direct us to the true good.

Who Gave the Torah to Israel, His nation: Lishmah Education

This berachah is not just here for our benefit, to make sure that we understand the mitzvos for our own sake. The mitzvos were not given to individuals, but to a nation. As a nation, we are obligated to pass on our knowledge from generation to generation. This obligation falls upon the father, who must teach his son about mitzvos. But how should he do this? After all, kids aren't interested in mitzvos.

The one who answered this question is the Rambam, in his Introduction to Perek Chelek:

Let us assume that a young child was brought to an educator with the intent that he will teach the child Torah. This is the ultimate good and will lead the child to perfection. Nevertheless, because he is young and immature, he will not appreciate that this is good, nor will he see how it will bring him to perfection.

Therefore, it is necessary for the educator, who is more developed, to encourage the child by offering something he will appreciate according to his childish conception of things. And so, the educator will tell him: Study and I will give you nuts, figs, or a piece of candy.

This will make the child study and try. It is not that he is interested in the study itself – he does not comprehend the value of that at all. He wants to gain the food [he has been promised]. Eating that food is more important for him than the study, and undoubtedly more satisfying. Therefore, he will regard the study as work and effort that he must undergo to receive the object of his desire: the nut or the piece of candy.
When he grows older and develops his mind, he will view lightly the things that he previously thought were important, and instead will consider other things to be valuable. Therefore, to encourage him to study, he will be promised the things that he then thinks are valuable. For example, his teacher will tell him: Study, and I will buy you attractive shoes or clothes that look like this. Then also, he will not be studying for the sake of study, but instead to receive the promised garment. The clothes are more important to him than his study. Indeed, they are the object of his study.

When his mind becomes more developed, and he understands enough to regard these things as negligible, he will be encouraged to study [by the promises of] things that are more valuable. His teacher will tell him: Study this passage or this chapter and I will give you a dinar or two dinarim. Even at that stage, he will be studying and applying effort for the sake of obtaining the money, and he will regard obtaining the money as more important than the study itself. For [in his mind], the ultimate purpose of the study is to obtain the money he was promised.

And when he reaches a deeper level of understanding, and knows to appreciate even this matter, [money,] as having little importance, he will be encouraged by something that is of even greater eminence. He will be told: Study so that you will become a rabbi or a judge, and others will honor you. They will stand before you, endeavor to uphold your words and enhance your reputation, both in your lifetime and afterwards, like so and so, and so and so. And so he will study to reach this position; the ultimate in his mind will be that other people will honor him, elevate him and praise him.

All this is shameful. Nevertheless, it is necessary, because of the capricious nature of man, who makes the ultimate goal of study something else than the study itself, and who says: Why am I studying? To gain [something I want – i.e., he takes] a facetious [approach to] truth. Our Sages called this shelo lishmah (not for its own sake). In other words, he fulfills the mitzvos and does them and learns and strives, not for the sake of the thing itself, but for the sake of something else.

The Rambam's approach to education can be boiled down to one principle: The educator must understand the student's conception of the good, and work with that conception of the good, gradually weaning him of this false good and guiding him to the true good. The true good is called lishmah (for its own sake):

The purpose of learning should only be knowledge itself. Likewise, the end of [the pursuit of] truth is only to know that it is true; the mitzvos are truth, and therefore, their end is their fulfilment.

Arbah Banim: A Guide to Mitzvah Education

We can now understand the purpose of the introduction to the Arbah Banim. The purpose of the introduction is to prepare the father to teach his son about mitzvos. In order to do so, he must first reflect on what mitzvos are: since they were given by the Source of all existence, they must be the means of attaining completeness of human existence, which the true good. Why does he need mitzvos to pursue the true good? Because he is blinded by the false fantasy-notions of good from his egocentric animal psyche. So too, his son is blinded by his own fantasy-notion of the good. In order to teach mitzvos to his child, he will have to work within his child's conception of the good, and gradually guide him to the true good.

If this theory is correct, then the four sons in the Hagadah are examples of different conceptions of the good and guidelines for how to apply the lo lishmah method of education to these conceptions. I haven't fully applied this idea to the Arbah Banim to see if it holds true. I am afraid that will have to wait until after Pesach.

May we all merit to attain completeness of existence through the mitzvos, and in so doing, have a truly good Pesach. Blessed is the Makom Who gave Torah to Israel, His nation!

Baruch ha'Makom #2

• "Blessed is the Makom Who gave Torah to Israel, His nation. The Torah spoke to four sons: chacham, rasha, tam, and eino yodea lishol."
• (1) What is the purpose of this introduction? (2) Why is the introduction written in the form of a berachah (blessing)? (3) What is the meaning of “Ha’Makom” ("The Place") as a name of God? (4) Why is Ha’Makom used here? (5) What is the subject of the berachah?
• Step #1: Ha'Makom does not mean "the Omnipresent One." Rather, it means: "The Source of All Existence," which alludes to the idea that His Existence is Necessary and Independent, in contrast to the existence of the universe, which is contingent.

The Meaning of Baruch

Now that we understand that Ha’Makom means “Source of all existence,” our fourth question – What is the subject of the berachah? – becomes even stronger. To put it bluntly, Ha’Makom is a lofty, philosophical idea of God, whereas “Who gave Torah to Israel," is a more personal, providential idea of God. From the standpoint of the latter, we are God’s treasured nation to whom He gave His Torah. From the standpoint of the former, we are contingent existences, along with all of the other existences in the universe, who all derive their existence from the Primary Existent. Where is the unity in these two radically different ideas about God?

The answer lies in the one phrase we haven’t yet examined: “baruch.” What do we mean when we say, “Baruch atoh Hashem”? Are we bestowing a blessing upon God? God forbid! Rather, as the Sefer ha’Ikkarim writes (2:28), berachah refers to “an increase and abundance of good.” The Sefer ha’Ikkarim explains that the phrase “baruch” is sometimes applied to the recipient of an increase of good, and is sometimes applied to the source of that good.

Thus, the word “baruch atoh” in our berachos does not mean “blessed are You” but “You are the source of good.” For example, “Baruch atoh Hashem Elokeinu Melech ha’olam, borei peri ha’eitz” means “You, Hashem our God, King of the universe, are the source of good – Creator of the fruit of the tree.”

Good and Bad: the False Idea

Now that we understand “Baruch” to mean “source of good” and “Ha’Makom” to mean “Source of all existence,” we can put two and two together and translate the first half of our berachah. Baruch Ha’Makom means “the Source of all existence is the source of good.”

What is the significance of this statement? In order to answer this question, we must ask a much more basic question: What is “good”?

We often conceive of goodness in terms of pleasure or utility. Something is good to the extent that it provides us with pleasure or facilitates our pursuit of pleasure, whether that pleasure is physical or psychological. To the hungry guy, the good steak is the one that provides the most pleasurable eating experience. To the average male, the good female is the one who, as a sexual object, is the most pleasing.

This conception of the good is founded on one, egocentric premise: "My existence is the only thing that matters - therefore, I am the measure of goodness in the universe. Things are good insofar as they conform to me."

This idea of the good was the consequence we sufferred after eating from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil: "and you shall be like gods, knowers of good and bad" (Bereishis 3:5). Rashi explains: "you shall be like gods - creators of worlds." Blinded by our own feelings of greatness and supremacy, we create our own "worlds" of good and bad, which become the lenses through which we perceive reality: the world of material wealth, the world of physical beauty, the world of fame, the world of sports, the world of academia, the world of religiosity, and so on.

All of these worlds - these elaborate value-systems by which we deem things "good" or "bad" - all share the same underlying way of evaluating good and bad: "If it is good for me, then it is good, but if it is bad for me, it is bad. If it helps me to achieve the god-like supremacy I seek, then it is good, but if it diminishes that god-like supremacy, it is bad."

Good and Bad: the True Idea (Theoretical)

The Torah's conception of good and bad can be seen in the first chapter of Bereishis, in God's creation of plants and animals:

God said, "Let the earth sprout vegetation: herbage yielding seed, fruit trees yielding fruit each after its kind, containing its own seed on the earth." And it was so. And the earth brought forth vegetation: herbage yielding seed after its kind, and trees yielding fruit, each containing its seed after its kind. And God saw that it was good . . .

God said, "Let the waters teem with living creatures, and fowl that fly about over the earth across the expanse of the heavens." And God created the great sea-giants and every living being that creeps, with which the waters teemed after their kinds; and all winged fowl of every kind. And God saw that it was good . . .

God said, "Let the earth bring forth living creatures, each according to its kind: animal, and creeping thing, and beast of the land each according to its kind." And it was so. God made the beast of the earth according to its kind, and the animal according to its kind, and every creeping being of the ground according to its kind. And God saw that it was good.

One cannot fail to notice (especially with my underlining and bolding) that goodness is associated with kinds. It is not this or that particular plant or animal that is good; goodness is only ascribed to the species. Why aren't particular plants and animals good? Because the individual members of the species come into being, and pass away, whereas the species itself continues on.

In order to understand why this makes the species "good" relative to the individual member, we must understand what the Torah means when it says that God created plants and animals. What is "cow"? "Cow" is a tzurah (form): an organizational principle by which matter is unified. When we point to Bessie and say "cow," we are not referring to a certain quantity organic matter congregated in a certain location. Rather, we are referring to the tzurah (or, loosely speaking, the "idea") of cow as expressed in that organic matter.

Now we can understand the Torah's concept of good, and why the species is "good" relative to the individual member. Goodness is the expression of tzurah in matter. Bessie, the particular cow, expresses the tzurah of cow for only a brief time. Eventually, she will perish. The matter of which she was composed will decompose and take on new tzuros: the tzurah of soil, which will eventually take on the tzurah of grass, which will eventually take on the tzurah of Bessie #2, and so on.

If goodness is the expression of tzurah in matter, then Bessie's goodness is very limited. The goodness of the species of cow, on the other hand, is qualitatively superior to the goodness of the particular cow. Bessie is born, lives, then dies; her matter expresses the tzurah of cow for a momentary blink, and is gone. The species of cow, on the other hand, expresses the tzurah of cow in perpetuity. Through the species, the tzurah of cow that God created on the fifth day is expressed in perpetuity.

If this idea seems too theoretical and far removed from everyday life, consider a simple example. Imagine you are a judge in a gardening show. Your job is to evaluate the "goodness" of all of the flowers you see and select the best specimen. Before you are two roses. One of them is clearly dying. Its petals are brown, its leaves are wilted, and it has a pungent odor. The other is alive and beautiful. Its petals are red, its leaves are dark green, its stem its aroma is intoxicating. If you are a good judge, you will deem the second rose "good" relative to the other. Why? Because the second specimen expresses the tzurah of rose more fully than the first. Our minds have formed an idea of Rose from the many roses we have seen. When we call this rose "good" insofar as it conforms to our idea of Rose, and the other "bad" insofar as it fails to conform.

In summary, "goodness" means completeness of existence: the conformity of matter to tzurah.

Good and Bad: the True Idea (As Applied to Man)

Now we can appreciate the significance of the idea of Baruch Ha'Makom. As we have demonstrated, Baruch Ha’Makom means “the Source of all existence is the source of good.” Goodness and badness should not be measured by conformity of the material world to man - to his appetites and his fantastical yearning for supremacy. Rather, goodness and badness is measured by conformity to God - to the tzuros He created, by which Malchus Shamayim is maintained.

Thus, the "good steak" is not the steak which affords the greatest eating experience, but the steak which conforms to the tzurah of food which God created: namely, that which sustains the existence of man by providing nutrition. The "good female" is not the female which best corresponds to man's ideal sex object. Rather, the "good female" is the one which best expresses the tzurah of Woman that He created: namely, the eizer knegdo (the true and equal helper of man).

The statement "Baruch Ha’Makom" ("the Source of all existence is the source of good") reorients us to the true idea of good. It reminds us that good and bad are not determined by us, but by the Source of all existence. Goodness is not conformity to the fantasy-worlds we create and impose upon reality, but by conformity to the world of tzurah which He created which governs the entire universe.

Baruch ha’Makom #1

Year after year I find myself drawn to the section of the Hagadah known as the Arbah Banim (The Four Sons). But this year I was bothered by something else: the introduction to the Arbah Banim. According to the Rambam’s Hagadah, the introduction reads as follows:

Blessed is the Makom Who gave Torah to Israel, His nation. The Torah spoke to four sons: chacham (“wise”), rasha (“evil”), tam (“simple”), and eino yodea lishol (doesn’t know to ask).

This short introduction raises several questions:

1. What is the purpose of this introduction? How would we misunderstand the Arbah Banim without this introduction, and how does the introduction correct this misunderstanding?
   
2. Why is the introduction written in the form of a berachah (blessing)? This seems like an unusual style for an introduction. Why couldn’t it have been written as a simple statement? What would be lacking?
   
3. What is the meaning of “Ha’Makom” as a shem Hashem (name of God)?Ha’Makom is an unusual, relatively infrequently used name of God. Each and every shem Hashem has its own unique meaning and connotation. What is the meaning of Ha’Makom?
   
4. Why is Ha’Makom used here? After we understand the meaning of the name Ha’Makom, we must ask: Why it was necessary to Ha’Makom in this particular berachah?
   
5. What is the subject of the berachah? The berachah has two components: “Blessed is the Makom” and “Who gave Torah to Israel, His nation.” Indeed, our version of the Hagadah separates these into two distinct berachos. What is the relationship between the two parts of this berachah? What is the unifying idea?

The Incorrect Translation of Ha’Makom

Let’s start with the third question: What is the meaning of “Ha’Makom” as a shem Hashem? Literally, “Ha’Makom” means “The Place.” This strikes us as very strange. In what sense is Hashem considered “a place” – or, more accurately, “The Place”?

Every single English Hagadah I have seen translates Ha’Makom as “The Omnipresent.” In my humble opinion, this is a terrible translation. It is terrible not only because it is wrong, but because it conveys a fundamentally incorrect idea about Hashem and contradicts the unanimous explanation offered by the Baalei Mesora (transmitters of the Oral Tradition).

“Omnipresent” means “present in all places.” One of the yesodei ha’Torah (foundations of Torah) is that Hashem is not physical. Consequently, He has no physical properties. “Place” is a property of physical properties; as such, it cannot be applied to Hashem. The Rambam writes this explicitly in the Laws of the Foundations of Torah (1:11):

Once it has been clearly demonstrated that He is not physical, it becomes clear that He has no physical properties or conditions: not combination or separation, not place or measure, not ascent or descent, not right or left, not front or back, not sitting or standing, nor does He exist in time – which would necessitate Him having a beginning and an end, and therefore partake of multiplicity – and He does not change, for there is nothing capable of causing Him to change.

To believe that Hashem has a place is tantamount to believing that Hashem is physical, since “place” is only a property of physical things. To say that He is Omnipresent – that He exists is in all places – is no different than saying, “He is all shapes,” “He is all sizes,” or “He is all colors,” since “place” is a physical property, just like shape, size, and color.

The Correct Translation of Ha’Makom

The Sages (Tanchuma, Ki Tisa 27; Bereishis Rabbah 68:9) give the following explanation of the name “Ha’Makom”: “He is the Place of the universe, but the universe is not His place.” (Note that the Sages do not say, “The universe is His place” or “He fills the whole universe,” as some would have it.)

The Avudarham provides us with one more hint. He writes: “And you will find that the gematria of ‘Makom’ is the same as gematria of YHVH according to its cheshbone gadol (greater calculation).” The cheshbone gadol of YHVH is the sum of each letter multiplied by its own numerical value: (10 x 10) + (5 x 5) + (6 x 6) + (5 x 5) = 186, which is equivalent to the numerical value of MaKOM: 40 + 100 + 6 + 40 = 186.

Neither the Sages nor the Avudarham translate the metaphor explicitly. What are they getting at? What is the idea of Ha’Makom?

We have one interpretive principle at our disposal: dibrah Torah ki’lshon bnei adam (the Torah speaks in the language of man). The Torah encodes abstract ideas in familiar terms. We use the term “place” all the time. In simple terms, what do we mean when we speak of “the place” of an object? Physically, the place of an object is that which underlies and supports it. For example, I am typing this article on my laptop. The place of my laptop is the table underneath it which supports it. If we wanted to sound fancy, we would define “place” as “the substratum of the object.”

According to this definition of place, the meaning of the Sages becomes clear. “He is the place of the universe, and the universe is not His place” means that His Existence “supports” the existence of the universe, but the universe does not “support” His Existence. In other words, He is the Cause of the universe’s existence, but the universe is not the cause of His Existence.

Now we can understand what the Avudarham meant when he said that the gematria of Makom is equivalent to the cheshbone-gadol gematria of YHVH. He means that the idea of the name Ha’Makom alludes to the idea of the name YHVH. What is the idea of the name YHVH? The Rambam beings the Laws of the Fundamentals of Torah with the statement, “Yesode Ha’yesodos V’amud Ha’Chochmos” which clearly alludes to the name YHVH. The translation is as follows:

1:1 The foundation of foundations and the pillar of all sciences is to know that there is a Primary Existent, Who brought into existence all existences, and all of the existences from heaven to earth and everything in between only exist by the reality of His Existence.

1:2 And if one could entertain the thought that He did not Exist, nothing else would be able to exist.

1:3 And if one could entertain the thought that all of the other existences besides Him didn’t exist, He alone would Be Existent, and He would not Be negated by their negation, for all the existences need Him, but He – blessed is He – does not need them, nor any one of them.

“He is the place of the universe, but the universe is not His place.” He causes the universe’s existence, but the universe does not cause His existence. He is the Independent (or Necessary) Existence, whereas the universe is a dependent (or contingent) existence.

What is the difference between YHVH and Ha’Makom? YHVH refers only God – to the idea that He is the Independent Existence. Ha’Makom refers to the relationship (so to speak) between His Independent Existence and our dependent existence. If I had to translate both names into English, I would translate YHVH as “True Existence” and Ha’Makom as “Source of all existence.” “Source of all existence” alludes to the fact that He is the True Existence, since contingent existence can only come from True Existence.

Geulah Will Have to Wait Until Pesach

Well, I've been working on Bechoros and the Mitzvos of Pesach #4 for hours now. As I wrote, I sensed that although I may have the general idea, I lack sufficient understanding to organize the ideas in writing. Moreover, my recent exchange with Rabbi Sacks has made me realize that I am not clear enough on the conceptual terminology I was working with to be able to employ it in my post, as I had intended.

Perhaps I will arrive at a clearer understanding through the geulah experience on the night of the 15th of Nisan. If that should happen, then I will continue this series of posts during chol ha'moed.

Until then, I'll post another idea I've been working on, and we'll see where that takes us.

Bechoros and the Mitzvos of Pesach #3

Revised Ending: 4/17/2008, 11:35am

• Question: What is the point of the mitzvos of Pesach?
• Step #1: The mitzvos of Pesach can only be understood in the context of mitzvas bechoros.
• Step #2: Mitzvas bechoros is designed to make us realize that everything belongs to Hashem, and to remind us of makkas bechoros (the plague of the firstborn).
• Remaining Questions: (1) What is the metaphor of ownership as applied to Hashem? (2) Why do we need mitzvas bechoros to remind us that everything belongs to Hashem? (3) What is the relationship between the two ideas conveyed by mitzvas bechoros?

What is Ownership for Us? (Bailus ha'Adam - Monetary Ownership)

Needless to say, Hashem does not own things in the same way that we own them; His ownership is not monetary. Nevertheless, since halacha is modeled after real-world concepts, we should be able to define our ownership and use that definition to understand the metaphor of Hashem's ownership. Since our ultimate goal is to understand the mitzvos of Pesach, we will explore the concept of ownership through two mitzvos of Pesach: the mitzvos of bal yeraei u'bal yimatzei - "chametz shall not be seen in your possession" (Shemos 13:7) and "chametz shall not be found in your houses" (ibid. 12:19).

The Sages point out a major difficulty with the mitzvos of bal yeraei u'bal yimatzei: there is no way to violate them! The Gemara (Pesachim 6b) presents this question in the context of the obligation of bitul (negating one's chametz). Specifically, the question arises regarding a case in which one found a tasty loaf of bread on Pesach. The Gemara suggests that he should simply do another bitul on it. The Gemara then rejects this answer, saying that a person can only do bitul on that which he owns, but chametz on Pesach is not in his possession, as the Gemara explains:

There are two things that are not in a person's possession but the Torah considers them as though they are in his possession. They are: a pit in the public domain, and chametz after the sixth hour [on Erev Pesach].

On the surface, this Gemara is difficult to understand. Why can't a person own chametz on Pesach? The Gemara assumes this premise, but doesn't explain it. It makes sense that one cannot own a pit in the public domain: the public domain is public property, not personal property. But this explanation doesn't suffice for chametz after the sixth hour on Erev Pesach. What removes ownership at the sixth hour? (The answer to the question "What does the Gemara mean that the Torah considers it as though chametz is in a person's possession?" is beyond the scope of this blog. See the long Ran at the beginning of Pesachim. If you are interested in Rebbi's current explanation of this halacha, listen to this shiur.)

What changes at the sixth hour on Erev Pesach? The issur hanaah - the prohibition to derive benefit from chametz - comes into effect. Once chametz becomes assur b'hanaah, it is no longer subject to ownership.

Why does the issur hanaah preclude ownership? The answer to this question is the key to understanding ownership. Ownership of an object means the legal ability to utilize the object as one pleases. For instance, consider what it means to own an apple: I can utilize the apple as food by eating it; I can utilize the apple's fragrant aroma by smelling it; I can utilize the apple as a source of income by selling it; I can utilize the apple to obtain good will by giving it as a gift. If someone else were to utilize the apple in any of these ways without my permission, he would be violating my rights as owner.

But upon further examination, it seems that our definition of ownership is lacking. There are other ways to express ownership which cannot be described as utility. For instance: I can render my apple hefker (ownersless); I can make a neder (vow) and prohibit myself to use it; I can make it hekdeish (property of the Mikdash), and therefore prohibited for personal use; I can wantonly destroy it, thereby removing all of its utility. All of these are included in the rights of ownership. We must refine our definition.

Perhaps we can say the following instead: Ownership of an object is the legal ability to define that object's existence. This may sound somewhat abstract, but if we consider the aforementioned expressions of ownership, we'll see that they all flow from this definition. For example: I can define my apple as food, which I express by eating it; I can define it as merchandise, which I express by selling it; I can define it as a matana (gift), which I express by giving it to my friend; I can define it as hekdeish, which I express by donating it to Mikdash; I can make define it as hefker, which I express by relinquishing my ownership over it, and so on.

What is Ownership for Hashem? (Malchus Shamayim - Sovereignty of Existence)

We can understand what it means to say that Hashem "owns" the earth and all that fills it. For me to own something means that I am the cause of its legal state of existence; for Hashem to own something means that He is the Cause of its actual state of existence.

This idea is expressed in Malki-Tzedek's praise: "Blessed is Abram of God, the Transcendent God, the One Who acquires heaven and earth" (Bereishis 14:19), which Rashi explains, "this means 'Who makes heaven and earth' - by creating them, He acquired them for Himself." In other words, as the One Who endowed the heaven and earth with existence, He is the One Who determines how they exist.

What does it mean that He determines how things exist? It means that all creations in the universe - from the tiniest particle to the largest galaxy - exist in strict conformity with the harmonious order of Hashem’s lawful design. We often refer to this order as “natural law” – the fixed principles by which the matter in the universe is continually organized and reorganized into the phenomena we know. We refer to Hashem’s absolute sovereignty over existence as Malchus Shamayim. Unlike Malchus Basar v’Dam (human kingship), Malchus Shamayim is absolute. “The earth and everything that fills it is His” means there is no aspect of existence that is not governed by His law. All existence was caused by Him, and is governed by Him.

But this poses a difficulty: Isn't the idea of Malchus Shamayim obvious? All of science is founded upon the idea of Malchus Shamayim. We no longer live in a primitive world, believing that the forces of nature are controlled by gods or spirits. Every scientist is aware of Malchus Shamayim, and seeks to grasp the underlying order of all natural phenomena. Why do we need mitzvas bechoros to remind us of this idea?

Bechoros and the Mitzvos of Pesach #2

• Review of the Question and Step #1:
• Question: What is the point of the mitzvos of Pesach?
• Approach: The Torah begins its presentation of the mitzvos of Pesach with an introductory statement about the mitzvah of bechoros, then proceeds to outline the mitzvos of Pesach, and concludes by resuming its discussion with the halachos of bechoros. What is the reason for such a strange literary presentation?
• Step #1: The mitzvos of Pesach are presented in the context of mitzvas bechoros because they can only be understood in that context. The Torah introduced its the mitzvos of Pesach with a statement about mitzvas bechoros because the idea of mitzvas bechoros is underlies all the mitzvos of Pesach.

The Torah's Clues to Understanding Mitzvas Bechoros

In order to understand mitzvas bechoros, let's look for clues in the Written Torah. Here are the pesukim from the two sections in Shemos which discuss mitzvas bechoros. To help us focus on the mitzvah of bechoros, I've omitted the intermediate pesukim which deal with the mitzvos of Pesach and tefilin and underlined what I think are the essential clues:

Hashem spoke to Moshe, saying, “Sanctify to Me every firstborn; the first issue of every womb among the Children of Israel, of man and beast, is Mine . . . It shall come to pass, when Hashem will bring you to the land of the Canaanites, as He swore to you and your forefathers, and He will have given it to you; then you shall set apart every first issue of the womb for Hashem, and of every first issue that is dropped by livestock that belong to you, the males are Hashem’s. Every first-issue donkey you shall redeem with a lamb or kid; if you do not redeem it, you shall axe the back of its neck. And you shall redeem every human firstborn among your sons. And it shall be when your son will ask you at some future time, "What is this?" you shall say to him, "With a strong hand Hashem removed us from Egypt from the house of bondage. And it happened when Pharaoh stubbornly refused to send us out, that Hashem killed all the firstborn in the land of Egypt, from the firstborn of man to the firstborn of beast. Therefore I offer to Hashem all male first issue of the womb, and I shall redeem all the firstborn of my sons.

The Torah provides us with three clues:

1. We do this mitzvah "for Hashem" - that is, for the sake of knowledge of God. This mitzvah is intended to convey two ideas about God:
2. To remind us that the first issue of every womb belongs to Him, and
3. To remind us that in response to Pharaoh's stubbornness, He killed the firstborns of Egypt and removed us from Egypt with a strong hand.

Help from the Sefer ha'Chinuch

The Sefer ha'Chinuch (#9) corroborates our observation that these two ideas are fundamental to mitzvas bechoros:

The roots of this mitzvah are as follows: Hashem desired us to merit by performing this mitzvah with our first fruits in order to know that everything is His, and all that man has nothing in this world except for what Hashem allots him in His acts of kindness. A person will understand this when he sees that after he exerting himself to the utmost and toiling exceedingly in this world. When he finally reaches the moment where his efforts yield fruit - the first fruit which is dear to him like the apple of his eye - he is immediately compelled to give it to the Kadosh Baruch Hu, and to relinquish his ownership and pass it into the ownership of his Creator. Additionally, the purpose of this mitzvah is to remember the great miracle that Hashem wrought for us with the firstborns of Egypt, whom He killed and from whom He saved us.

The Sefer ha'Chinuch supports with our theory that the mitzvah of bechoros is designed to give us knowledge of God, namely, knowledge that our firstborns belong to Him and knowledge of makas bechoros (the plague of the firstborn).

We should note that the Sefer ha'Chinuch adds one important qualification. The purpose of the mitzvah is not simply to show that our firstborns belong to God, but that ALL of our possessions belong to God, as it is stated, "The earth and everything that fills it are His" (Tehilim 24:1). All of our possessions are the result of His beneficence. The mitzvah is limited to our firstborns because (a) they are our most treasured possessions, and (b) it would be impossible to command us to give away all of our possessions.

The Next Set of Questions

The Sefer ha'Chinuch only provides us with a starting point. These clues raise three new questions:

1. What is the metaphor of ownership as applied to Hashem? Hashem does not own things in monetarily, as we own them. In what sense does He own them?
2. Why do we need the mitzvah of bechoros to recognize His ownership? The Torah implies that without the mitzvah of bechoros, we would not recognize His ownership. Why not?
3. What is the relationship between the two ideas conveyed by kedushas bechoros? Is the idea of mitzvas bechoros as a reminder of makas bechoros (plague of the firstborn) entirely unrelated to the idea of mitzvas bechoros as a means of recognizing that everything belongs to the Kadosh Baruch Hu, or is there a unity underlying both of these ideas? If the latter, what is that unity?

The plot thickens . . .

Bechoros and the Mitzvos of Pesach #1

Updated: 4/18/08, 3:54pm

Introduction

One of the fundamental principles of methodology I’ve learned this year is stated by the Rambam at the end of his introduction to the Mishneh Torah:

Thus, I have called this work the [Complete] Restatement of the [Oral] Law (Mishneh Torah), for a person reads the Written Torah first and then reads this work, and knows from it the entire Oral Torah, without needing to read any other book between them.

Rabbi Sacks, in the mission statement of his blog (scroll down to the bottom), explains (with my emphasis in bold):

While Rambam saw the confusion in Torah Shebaal Peh, he clearly presupposed a living tradition of reading Torah Shebichtav ordered to understanding Mitzvos. This tradition was founded upon a grammatical/logical method. In our day this tradition has become confused as well. There is very little effort put into understanding Torah Shebichtav as a source material for Mitzvos at all, let alone based upon a coherent grammatical/logical method. Fortunately great masters have stepped in to fill this breach. Ralbag wrote an entire peyrush la-torah dedicated to showing the way to finding Mitzvos in Torah Shebichtav. Ramchal wrote excellent works on the logical method and grammatical approach needed to unravel the principles underlying these texts. What remains for us as a community is to gain facility in these tools of the Soul provided us by the ancient masters to attain the end articulated by Rambam.

Although I am not yet familiar with the Ralbag’s method, I have started to make an effort in my own learning to follow the Rambam’s principle of understanding the halachos of the Oral Torah in light of the Written Torah. Having said that, it seems that the best place to begin to answer our question is the Written Torah – particularly, the pesukim from which the mitzvos of Pesach are derived.

Which of the many mitzvos of Pesach should we take as the starting point for our investigation? While all of the mitzvos of Pesach point to the fundamental ideas of yetzias mitzrayim, there is one mitzvah dedicated exclusively to that purpose: the mitzvah of sipur yetzias mitzrayim (telling the story of the Exodus from Egypt).

The Source of Mitzvas Sipur Yetzias Mitzrayim in the Written Torah

The Rambam identifies two different pesukim as the source of mitzvas sipur yetzias mitzrayim: “Remember this day (zachor es ha’yom hazeh) on which you departed from Egypt” (Shemos 13:3) and “And you shall tell your son (ve’higadeta l’vincha) on that day, saying, ‘It is because of this that Hashem acted on my behalf when I left Egypt’” (ibid. 13:8).

In the Mishneh Torah (Laws of Chametz and Matzah 7:1) the Rambam learns the essential mitzvah from the pasuk of zachor, and derives the time for the mitzvah (the night of the 15th of Nisan) from the pasuk of ve’higadeta. In the Sefer ha’Mitzvos (Positive Mitzvah #157) the Rambam derives the essential mitzvah from ve’higadeta, and learns from zachor that the mitzvah of sipur is obligatory even on a person who has no son.

I am not particularly interested in reconciling the Mishneh Torah and the Sefer ha’Mitzvos. I would, however, like to understand these two pesukim. Let us examine these pesukim in their context:

Hashem spoke to Moshe, saying, “Sanctify to Me every firstborn; the first issue of every womb among the Children of Israel, of man and beast, is Mine.” Moshe said to the people, “Remember this day on which you departed from Egypt, from the house of bondage, for with a strong hand God removed you from here, and therefore chametz may not be eaten. Today you are leaving, in the month of the springtime. And it shall come to pass when Hashem shall bring you to the land of the Canaanite, the Hittite, the Emorite, the Hivvite, and the Jebusite, which He swore to your forefathers to give you – a land flowing with milk and honey – you shall perform this service in this month. For a seven-day period shall you eat matzos, and on the seventh day there shall be a festival to Hashem. Matzos shall be eaten throughout the seven-day period; no chametz may be seen in your possession, nor may leaven be seen in your possession in all your borders. And you shall tell your son on that day, saying, ‘It is because of this that Hashem acted on my behalf when I left Egypt.’ And it shall be for you a sign on your arm and a reminder between your eyes – so that Hashem’s Torah may be in your mouth – for with a strong hand Hashem removed you from Egypt. You shall observe this decree at its designated time from year to year.

The Problem

This paragraph is chock-full of mitzvos: the mitzvah to remember the day we left Egypt, the prohibition to derive benefit from chametz, the mitzvah to slaughter the Pesach-sacrifice, the mitzvah to eat the Pesach-sacrifice, the mitzvah to eat matzah on the night of Pesach, the prohibition to retain chametz in our possession during Pesach, and the mitzvos of the tefilin of the arm and the head.

But there is one mitzvah mentioned in this paragraph which sticks out like a sore thumb: the mitzvah of bechoros. We are commanded to sanctify (or redeem) the first issue of the womb, whether man, kosher animal, or donkey. Granted, the mitzvah of bechoros is related to Yetzias Mitzrayim, as Rashi explains, “[the first issue . . .] is Mine: I acquired it for myself by killing the firstborns of Egypt.” But isn’t it strange that a paragraph devoted almost entirely to the mitzvos of Pesach begins with the mitzvah of bechoros, which is not a mitzvah of Pesach but a mitzvah observed year-round? Not only that, but in the very next paragraph the Torah devotes resumes its discussion of the halachos of bechoros:

It shall come to pass, when Hashem will bring you to the land of the Canaanites, as He swore to you and your forefathers, and He will have given it to you; then you shall set apart every first issue of the womb to Hashem, and of every first issue that is dropped by livestock that belong to you, the males are Hashem’s. Every first-issue donkey you shall redeem with a lamb or kid; if you do not redeem it, you shall axe the back of its neck. And you shall redeem every human firstborn among your sons. And it shall be when your son will ask you at some future time, "What is this?" you shall say to him, "With a strong hand Hashem removed us from Egypt from the house of bondage. And it happened when Pharaoh stubbornly refused to send us out, that Hashem killed all the firstborn in the land of Egypt, from the firstborn of man to the firstborn of beast. Therefore I offer to Hashem all male first issue of the womb, and I shall redeem all the firstborn of my sons. And it shall be a sign upon your arm, and an ornament between your eyes, for with a strong hand Hashem removed us from Egypt."

In other words, the Torah begins its discourse on the mitzvos of Pesach with a single, introductory statement about the mitzvah of bechoros, proceeds to mention the main mitzvos of Pesach, and then resumes its discussion of bechoros in detail. What is the reason for this strange literary presentation?

Step #1: Bechoros as the Framework for Mitzvos of Pesach

Although we cannot fully answer the question at this point, we can make one observation which will serve as the first step of the answer.

It seems that the Written Torah is trying to teach us that there is an intimate relationship between the mitzvah of bechoros and the mitzvos of Pesach. Indeed, the pesukim imply that the mitzvos of Pesach can only be understood through the framework of mitzvas bechoros. It is for this reason that the Torah's discussion of the mitzvos of Pesach begin with mitzvas bechoros, and presents the mitzvos of Pesach in the context of mitzvas bechoros . . . literally!

In the repetition of these mitzvos in Devarim, Moshe Rabbeinu juxtaposes mitzvas bechoros with the mitzvos of Pesach once again. The section beginning, "Every firstborn male that is born in your cattle and in your flock, you shall sanctify to Hashem, your God" (Devarim 15:19-23) is immediately followed by the section beginning, "You shall observe the month of springtime and perform the pesach-offering for Hashem, your God, for in the month of springtime Hashem, your God, took you out of Egypt at night" (ibid. 16:1-8). Once again, mitzvas bechoros serves an introduction to a discourse on the mitzvos of Pesach.

Yet another indication of this relationship between bechoros and Pesach can be seen in the mitzvah of bikurim, the mitzvah to give up one's first fruits of the harvest to Mikdash, which is undeniably linked to bechoros. What does the Torah require us to do when we bring our bikurim? To talk about the Yetzias Miztrayim! The Torah states (Devarim 26:1-10):

It will be when you enter the Land that Hashem, your God, gives you as an inheritance, and you possess it, and dwell in it, that you shall take of the first fruit of every fruit of the ground that you bring in from your Land that Hashem, your God, gives you, and you shall put it in a basket and go to the place that Hashem, your God, will choose, to make His Name rest there . . . Then you shall call out and say before Hashem, your God, "An Aramean tried to destroy my father. He descended to Egypt and sojourned there, few in number, and there he became a nation - great, strong, and numerous. The Egyptians mistreated us and afflicted us, and placed hard work upon us. Then we cried out to Hashem, the God of our forefathers, and Hashem heard our voice and saw our affliction, our travail, and our oppression. Hashem took us out of Egypt with a strong hand and with an outstretched arm, with great awesomeness, and with signs and wonders. He brought us to this place, and He gave us this Land, a Land flowing with milk and honey. And now, behold! I have brought the first fruit of the ground that You have given me, O Hashem!" And you shall lay it before Hashem, your God, and you shall prostrate yourself before Hashem, your God. You shall be glad with all the goodness that Hashem, your God, has given you and your household - you and the Levite and the proselyte who is in your midst.

Recognize any of these pesukim? They are the same pesukim we expound upon to tell the story of yetzias mitzrayim in the Hagadah. The relationship between bechoros/bikurim is clear: mitzvas bikkurim drags us back to Pesach, and mitzvas sipur yetzias mitzrayim drags us back to bikkurim.

Perhaps the most astounding indication of this relationship can be seen in the section of the arbah banim (four sons) in the hagadah. The ben tam (simple son) asks, "What is this?" We answer: "With a strong hand Hashem removed us from Egypt from the house of bondage." From the hagadah it is clear that the ben tam is asking about the mitzvos of Pesach at the seder. But upon further examination, we notice something strange: the text of the ben tam's question and our answer were lifted directly from the parashah of bechoros! In the Chumash, the child's question is about the mitzvah of bechoros, and has nothing to do with the mitzvos of Pesach - yet, mitzvas bechoros is so integrally related to the mitzvos of Pesach that we give the exact same answer to the question, "What is this?"

Thus, the next question we must ask is: What is the relationship between the mitzvah of bechoros and the mitzvos of Pesach? In order to answer this question, we must understand the mitzvah of kedushas bechoros, which we will take up in the next post, God willing.

Introduction to this Year's Pesach Posts

Every year, in the course of my preparation for Pesach, I make a list of questions on the hagadah, the story of the Exodus from Egypt (Shemos, Chapters 1-12), and the halachos of the mitzvos of Pesach. These questions not only guide my learning during this time, but they shape my entire Pesach experience.

This year, I would like to focus on only one question – the question asked by the ben tam (simple son) in the hagadah: “Mah zos – What is this?”

The answer in the hagadah is very terse: “With a strong hand Hashem removed us from Egypt from the house of bondage.” Yes, the mitzvos on the night of the 15th of Nisan are intended to remind us of the events of the yetzias mitzrayim (Exodus from Egypt), but that just begs the question: What is the point of remembering yetzias mitzrayim? The Torah did not command us to discuss yetzias mitzrayim for the purpose of knowing Jewish history. The Torah intended for us to look beyond the mere facts of the yetzias mitzrayim and focus on the ideas. The Chumash clearly states that the makkos were educational. Hashem tells Pharaoh: "However, for this have I let you endure: in order to show you My strength and so that My Name (i.e. Knowledge of Me) may be declared throughout the world" (Shemos 9:16). What are the ideas in the yetzias mitzrayim are we supposed to learn? What are we supposed to gain from keeping and doing all of these mitzvos?

I am not 100% sure how to go about answering this question, but I have several approaches. With God's help, these approach will answer the ben tam's question.

FREE AT LAST!!!

I am finally free from

the tyranny of the evil

spam-blocking robots!

On Thursday, April 3rd I was blocked from my blog by Google's spam-blocking robots. Apparently, these "robots" suspected that my blog was a spam-blog, which automatically generates posts which are nothing more than spam. I was banned from posting anything on my blog. I was forced to request a blog review by a human being. It's been seven days, but I'm finally able to write on my blog again - and just in time for Pesach.

Although I was annoyed to the max by being barred from my own blog, I took some mussar from the experience. I realized that the reason I was so shocked and upset was because I took many things for granted, among them:

1. That utilizing Google's blogging service is a privelege, not a right. I ought to be thankful to Google for allowing me to use their service free of charge.
   
2. That freedom of the press - in this case, my ability to share ideas with other people in a public venue - is not something enjoyed by every society. I ought to be thankful that I live in a country with such freedoms.
   
3. That I have people to share ideas with, who help me in my learning and who prevent me from falling into error.

Although I'm sure there are many other things I have taken for granted and for which I should be thankful, minchah is coming and I am anxious to post.

It's great to be back!